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ANALISIS
Transfer Pricing by Multinational Firms
August, 2006
Background
This
journal examines how prices set by multinational firms vary across arm’s-length
and related-party customers. It takes advantage of a unique new dataset that
tracks the population of U.S. export transactions during the 1990s. Consistent
with a model of transfer pricing developed below, these data show that there is
a large positive gap between firms’ internal and external prices. The size of
this price wedge varies systematically with product differentiation, firms’
market power and destination-countries’ corporate tax rates and import tariffs.
U.S.
exports are highly concentrated among a relatively small number of firms. The
top 1 percent of exporters represent 0.03 percent of the total number of firms
in the United States but account for more than 80 percent of the value of
exports and employ more than 11 percent of all private-sector workers. Among
large exporters, U.S.-based multinationals, i.e., U.S.-owned multinationals or
local affiliates of foreign-owned multinationals, are dominant, controlling
more than 90 percent of total U.S. exports. A substantial fraction of these
exports — one third — occur within the firm, i.e., between the U.S.-based
multinational and a related party in a foreign country. The prominence of
multinational firms in international trade has stimulated a large body of
research attempting to explain what goods they produce, where they locate
production and how they respond to incentives and policies enacted by national
and sub-national governments. Their potential use of “transfer” pricing for
related-party transactions has, in particular, drawn widespread attention from
practitioners as well as academics. Given the large volume of U.S. and global
trade that takes place within multinationals, the potential impact of transfer
pricing is substantial, having the ability to influence official trade
statistics, national accounts aggregates and estimates of inflation and
productivity growth via its effect on import and export price indexes.
Multinational
firms have both managerial and financial motives for setting different prices
for arm’s-length and related-party transactions. Managerial motives include
establishing the proper incentives for disparate divisions within a
decentralized firm and avoiding “double marginalization” in the presence of
market power.5 Financial motivations encompass the minimization of corporate tax
and tariff payments as well as the avoidance of foreign exchange controls or
other restrictions on cross-border capital movements. Because obtaining direct
evidence on the pricing behavior of multinationals is extremely difficult,
existing empirical studies generally rely upon indirect evidence or responses
in a narrowly defined industry.
The
data employed in this paper are derived from point-of-export customs documents
tracking every U.S. international export transaction occurring between 1993 and
2000 inclusive. For each export shipment that leaves the United States, these
documents record the identity of the exporter, the Harmonized System product
classification and date of shipment, the value and quantity shipped, the
destination country, the transport mode, and whether the transaction takes
place at “arm’s length” or between “related parties”. These data provide
researchers the first opportunity to observe key features of multinational-firm
activity. Our focus in this paper is on the wedge between multinational firms’
arm’s-length and related-party prices (i.e., unit values) and the extent to
which this wedge varies with product and firm characteristics, market structure
and government policy.
We
find that export prices for intrafirm transactions are significantly lower than
prices for the same good sent to an arm’s-length customer. After matching
related-party sales by a firm to arm’s-length sales by the same firm for the
same product to the same country in the same month using the samemode of
transport, we find that the average arm’s-length price is 43 percent higher
than the related-party price. Product characteristics are influential in
determining this gap. While the wedge for commodities (i.e., undifferentiated
goods) averages 8.8 percent, the gap for differentiated goods is 66.7 percent.
Firm and market attributes are also influential: the difference between
arm’s-length and related-party prices are higher for goods shipped by larger
firms, by firms with higher export shares, and by firms in product-country
markets served by fewer exporters.
Consistent
with incentives to minimize taxation and import duties, we find that the wedge
between arm’s-length and related-party prices is negatively associated with
destination-country corporate tax rates and positively associated with
destination-country import tariffs. For each one percentage point reduction in
the foreign tax rate we find an increase in the price wedge of 0.56 to 0.66
percent. A one percentage point increase in the foreign customs duty increases
the price wedge by 0.56 to 0.60 percent. These results show that multinational
firms make substantial price adjustments to variation in country tax and tariff
rates. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that pricing responses to tax
rate differences across countries led to $5.5 billion in lower U.S. corporate
tax revenues and a $15 billion increase in the merchandise trade deficit in
2004.
We
also examine the role of exchange rates in multinational pricing. Though a
large literature is devoted to analyzing the interaction of firm market power
and exchange rate movements, it largely ignores issues of transfer pricing.
Here, we find that the price gap between firms’ arm’slength and related-party
prices varies negatively with countries’ real exchange rates, suggesting that
multinationals adjust their arm’s-length and related-party prices
asymmetrically in response to exchange rate shocks. Coefficient estimates imply
that a ten percent appreciation of the dollar against the destination currency
reduces the price gap by approximately 2 percent.
The
relatively large wedge we find between firms arm’s-length and related-party
prices has intriguing implications for how multinational performance should be
evaluated. Existing comparison of multinationals with purely domestic firms
generally find that they are larger, more innovative, exhibit higher
productivity, pay higher wages and employ greater numbers of skilled or
educated workers. Few, if any, of these
studies, however, contemplate the influence of transfer pricing, a potentially
important omission given that affiliates’ ability to purchase lower-priced
intermediate inputs from overseas parents may influence all of these measures
of performance. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We start by briefly
surveying the large existing literature on transfer pricing. In Section 3, we
develop a theoretical framework to highlight the product, firm, and country
attributes that potentially influence the gap between firms’ arm’s-length and
related-party prices. Section 4 describes the dataset and Section 5 outlines
how we compare arm’s-length and related-party prices empirically. We present
the main empirical results in Sections 6, 7 and 8. Section 9 concludes.
Purpose
These data provide researchers the
first opportunity to observe key features of multinational-firm activity. Focus
in this journal is on the wedge between multinational firms’ arm’s-length and
related-party prices (i.e., unit values) and the extent to which this wedge
varies with product and firm characteristics, market structure and government
policy.
Analysis Tools
Analysis
tools used are after-tax profit of the foreign arm's-length firm, Pre-tax
profits for the two divisions of the multinational, Taxable income for each
division of the multinational, After-tax profit of the two divisions, After-tax
profits for the parent firm, After-tax profits for the parent firm.
Object of
Research
The price of the company, the product, the country of
destination.
Discussion
Firm
Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD) which links individual trade transactions to
firms in the United States. This dataset has two components. The first, foreign
trade data assembled by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Customs Bureau,
captures all U.S. international trade transactions between 1993 and 2000
inclusive. For each flow of goods across a U.S. border, this dataset records
the product classification, the value and quantity shipped, the date of the
shipment, the destination (or source) country, the transport mode, and whether
the transaction takes place at “arm’s length” or between “related
parties”. “Related-party”, or intrafirm,
trade refers to shipments between U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries
as well as trade between U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies and their
affiliates abroad. For export transactions, firms are “related” if either party
owns, directly or indirectly, 10 percent or more of the other party (see
Section 30.7(v) of the Foreign Trade Statistics Regulations). This definition
of related party corresponds exactly to that used by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis in their annual surveys of multinational activity. The second
component of the LFTTD is the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) of the U.S.
Census Bureau, which records annual employment and survival information for
most U.S. establishments. Employment information for each establishment is
collected in March of every year and we aggregate the establishment data up to
the level of the firm. Matching the annual information in the LBD to the
transaction-level trade data yields the LFTTD. Products in the LFTTD are
tracked according to ten-digit Harmonized System (HS) categories, which break
exported goods into 8572 products. These products are distributed across
two-digit HS “industries”. And also records the share of exports in the
industry that are intrafirm and the share of total U.S. exports accounted by
the sector.
In
this paper we use the LFTTD to focus on the export transactions of U.S.-based
firms (as distinct from firms with U.S. nationality). From the raw LFTTD we
make two adjustments to create our estimation sample. First we eliminate firms
with fewer than 10 transactions during 1993 to 2000 inclusive. Second we
eliminate all transactions with missing, imputed or “converted” quantities to
ensure that all the observations for a particular product are measured in
comparable units and are actually recorded by the transacting firm. Depending
on the year, these screens reduce the number of transactions in our sample by
12 to 20 percent relative to the raw data. For the remaining observations, we
compute the export price as the unit value of the transaction, i.e., total
value per unit quantity.
In
order to understand the role of product and country characteristics in shaping
relatedparty prices we link several additional datasets to the LFTTD. Two
datasets record time-series variation in international corporate tax rates. The
first is the World Tax Database (WTD) compiled by the Office of Tax Policy
Research at the University of Michigan. From the WTD, we use the maximum
statutory corporate tax rate. Reports the maximum corporate tax rate for
countries in the database for 2000. Across the 140 countries, the mean (median)
tax rate is 30.8 (32) and the rates range from zero in the tax havens of
Bermuda and the Bahamas to 54 percent in Iran. One-hundred-twelve countries (80
percent) have tax rates at or below that of the United States. And also reports
estimates of countries effective tax rates estimated from Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) data, which record foreign revenues as well as the foreign taxes
paid by foreign affiliates of U.S. firms. Following the literature, we estimate
an effective corporate tax rate for country c in year t by dividing the foreign
income taxes paid by total foreign revenue less cost of goods sold and selling
and administrative costs.
The
ideal rate as suggested by the model is a firm-specific marginal tax rate and,
as such, neither measure of country tax rates is entirely satisfactory. Firms,
especially multinationals, may receive a variety of tax holidays or exemptions
that reduce their own marginal tax rate relative
to
the published statutory maximum. The calculated effective rate represents an
average, rather than a marginal, rate across firms in a destination country.
Two
datasets provide product information: the first is from Rauch (1999) and is
used to group products into differentiated and non-differentiated categories.
The second is from the UNCTAD TRAINS database and provides tariff rates for
six-digit HS (HS6) categories by country for 1993 to 1998.36, reports the
average differences in maximum and minimum tariff rates across products within
two digit industries. The range of tariffs (highest minus lowest) across
countries for the typical product is 64 percent. For example, the tariff rate
on handheld computers (HS 847130) ranges from 0 (Canada and others) to 22
percent (Brazil), with a mean and median of 4 percent while the tariff rate on
men’s dress shirts (HS 480990) ranges from 0 (Norway) to 80 percent (Mauritius).
Real
exchange rates are constructed using monthly data on the end of period (line
ae) nominal exchange rate and CPI (line 64) from the IMF International
Financial Statistics. Exchange rates are given in log units of foreign currency
per U.S. dollar.
Conclusion
Multinational firms based in the
U.S. report large differences in prices for arm’s-length and related-party
exports. These differences exist even for the same product produced by the same
firm shipped to the same country in the same month by the same mode of
transport. Following the development of a simple theoretical framework we find
that the price wedge between arm’slength and intrafirm prices responds to
differences in market structure, taxes, and tariffs.
Commodity
products show much smaller price wedges while those for differentiated products
are large, averaging over 67 percent. Similarly, firms with characteristics
indicating greater market power, i.e., larger firms and firms with bigger
export shares, have larger price differences. Looking across countries, we find
the price wedge is larger when the number of exporting firms is smaller.
Much
of the interest in transfer pricing centers on the behavior of firms in
response to taxes and tariffs. We find significant differences in price wedges
for the same product in countries with different tax and tariff rates. Lower
corporate taxes and higher tariffs are associated with larger gaps between the
arm’s-length and related-party prices.
Our
results suggest that transfer pricing may be playing an important role in
aggregate national accounting, potentially reducing the reported value of
exports and the current account (and thus GDP). The response of the price wedge
to tax rates indicates that tax minimization may be an important part of transfer
pricing decisions with consequences for the level of corporate tax revenue and
strategic responses to changes in the tax code.
This
paper also provides some of the first evidence on the effect of exchange rates
on pricing decisions inside and outside the firm. The price wedge responds to
movements in the real exchange rate: an appreciation of the dollar is
associated with a substantial narrowing of the wedge.
This
result supports the hypothesis that intrafirm trade plays a role in the
determination of aggregate export price indices. More importantly, this
suggests that intrafirm trade may play a role in insulating multinationals from
exchange rate movements.
Our
findings also are important for future research on the role of the
multinational corporation in both advanced and developing economies. The
sizable gap in prices may be playing an unobserved role in the perceived
performance advantage of multinational firms both at home and abroad.
Market
Price-Based Transfer Price Systems. Empirical Evidence for Effectiveness and
Preconditions
Problems and Perspectives in Management / Volume 5, Issue 2,
2007
Background
Within
organisations, market price-based transfer prices are used to internally
institutionalise structures that imitate markets. This aims to increase the
efficiency of the internal processes through improved coordination and
motivation of the corporate departments involved as these departments are
increasingly coordinated decentrally as independent units. The design of
internal market-price relationships goes far beyond the correct depiction of
business processes. Their assessment must also take place from an
organisational perspective, which is covered by this paper. As a result tax
issues are neglected.
Transfer
prices are categorised by their transaction basis into market price-based,
negotiated, and cost-based transfer prices. Market prices orientate themselves
to the prices of similar products on an external market, negotiated transfer
prices are the result of a negotiation process between the internal corporate
departments involved in the production process and are therefore also market
price-based. In contrast, cost-based transfer prices are derived from the
production costs of the intermediate product. In addition to this transaction
basis for a transfer price system, the transaction freedom is relevant. The
transaction freedom stipulates whether there is an internal compulsion to
deliver or purchase by the selling or purchasing department and whether the
intermediate product can be supplied from or sold to an external market.
This
paper investigates the use of transfer price systems in terms of the basis and
freedom of the transaction as well as the implications of this use in terms of
the motivation and efficiency effect. To do so, a range of hypotheses was
tested using a survey including a questionnaire on specific internal trading
transactions in 73 German companies using distribution-free, non-parametric
statistical methods. The focus on individual internal trading transactions is
an important differentiation characteristic compared with other studies.
Section 2 firstly gives a summary of the relevant literature and then derives
hypotheses based on this for the use of the transaction basis and freedom in
transfer price systems and their effect on motivation and efficiency, whereas
these effects will be evaluated from an internal perspective. Section 3
explains the procedure of the study and tests ten hypotheses using
distribution-free statistical methods. The discussion and interpretation of the
results take place in Section 4; finally Section 5 draws conclusions.
Purpose
The
purpose is the to increase efficiency and motivation in internal
production,where by market price-based transfer prices imply a particularly
positive effect, and a value measure for
the decentralised management of internal production processes.
Hypothesis
This leads us to the first hypothesis:
H 1a: Transfer price systems with a
market price-based transaction basis are assessed better than cost-based transfer
prices in terms of their motivation effect.
This leads us to the second hypothesis:
H 1b: Transfer price systems with a
market price-based transaction basis are assessed better than cost-based
transfer prices in terms of their efficiency effect.
Waiving these compulsions therefore
promotes motivation:
H 2a: A lack of delivery or purchase
compulsion is seen as positive for the motivation effect.
H 2b: A lack of delivery or purchase
compulsion is seen as positive for the efficiency effect.
Hypotheses on the use of market
price-based transfer price types
Hypotheses H1a and H1b appear initially
to imply that the transaction basis should generally be close to the market
price. However, this requires the availability of a similar substitute for the
intermediate product on an external market and adequate price transparency on
this market as only then are appropriately interpretable market prices
available as a reference. In this case the market price for the substitute is a
suitable value measure for the intermediate product1 and can therefore be used
as a measure for the internal transaction. Otherwise cost-based transfer prices
must be used as a transaction basis:
H 3a: The use of a market price-based
transaction basis is accompanied by better availability of external suppliers.
H 3b: The use of a market price-based
transaction basis is accompanied by better transparency of prices on the
external intermediate product market.
The use of internal transfer price
systems always implies that the departments are on an equal footingthat is
similar to a market. Restrictions in this principle may however occur if the
two departments have an asymmetric distribution of resources and skills. Such
asymmetry may have clear implications for the structure and use of competitive
advantages from the perspective of the entire company. A management function
that is essential from the perspective of the whole company for the
strategically superior department can be opposed appropriately by an asymmetric
design of the transaction freedom. The key to this is finally the question as
to whether it is advantageous from the perspective of the company as a whole to
give the strategically more important department a further-reaching
authorisation to access the resources of the other department. ticular advance
product according to the purchasing department’s rules, or vice versa the
purchasing department fulfils a subordinate sales function whilst the selling
department produces a unique product. A department’s clearly superior relative
strategic importance should reflect a management role with a corresponding
restriction in the interaction with the other department that is similar to a
free market – both for delivery and purchasing compulsion and for access to the
market (one-sided external purchase or sale):
H 4a: Differences in the relative
strategic importance of the departments are accompanied by asymmetric
management of the delivery/purchase compulsion.
H 4b: Differences in the relative,
strategic importance are accompanied by asymmetric market access (one-sided
external purchase or sale).
A market price-based transfer price in
particular provides a realistic, external comparison, if the departments are
also given freedom to act that is correspondingly similar to the market. If
vice versa a delivery compulsion is introduced, the delivering department can
no longer act completely in line with the efficiency requirements of the
external market that are reflected in the market price. It may then be obliged
to produce an uneconomic quantity of the intermediate product. In this case
there can be no positive efficiency or motivation effect. Similar implications
result for other restrictions in the symmetry of the transaction freedom. If
the purchasing department can buy the intermediate product on the external
market whilst the supplying department can not sell it on the external market,
the purchasing department is in a much better negotiating position and can
exploit this in the negotiation process. In addition, negotiations on setting the
specific level of the transfer price can only be sufficient if both the price
and quantity are freely negotiable.
The selection of the transaction basis
and freedom design parameters should therefore be coherent, i.e., be consistent
in organisational theory terms. Otherwise a contradiction to the system design
could occur:
H 5a: A market price-based transaction
basis is accompanied by the lack of delivery and purchase compulsion.
H
5b: A market price-based transaction basis occurs together with free, external
sales and purchases.
Analysis Tools
An analytical tool used in this
journal is non-parametric statistical methods, and various hypotheses were
tested using the survey included a questionnaire on specific internal trade
transactions in 73 German companies.
Object of
Research
Object of research in this journal is transfer pricing,
and internal trade transactions in 73 German companies with the transfer price
and the market-based price.
Discussion
Numerous
studies on the use of market price-based transfer prices come to the conclusion
that around half of the transfer prices used are market price-based in terms of
their transaction basis. In a long-term study of 247 US companies, Tang (1993,
25) determined that market prices are used in 37%, negotiated transfer prices
in 17% and cost-based transfer prices in 46% of cases. A study by Vancil (1978,
114) reached similar conclusions in a study of 239 US companies (market prices:
31%; negotiated transfer prices: 22%; cost-based transfer prices: 47 %).
Another common feature is the statement that market prices are most frequently
used as a transaction basis when there is an external market price. In
addition, Tang (1993, 25) ascertains as part of a long-term comparison between
1977 and 1990 that the importance of market price-based transfer prices had
increased over time. The question as to whether negotiated transfer prices
should be viewed as a separate category of transfer prices is assessed
differently.
On
the basis of his qualitative study, Eccles comes to the conclusion that in
particular the corporate strategy, the administrative process when setting the
transfer price and the adaptation of the system to the situation must be
considered. Eccles’ (1985, 1) design recommendations relate in particular to a
consistent relationship to the corporate strategy, especially to vertical
integration. Similar recommendations are also found in Larson (1974), Granick
(1975), Mostafa et al. (1984) and Kreuter (1999).
Statements
on the transaction freedom (compulsion to buy/sell and the opportunity for
external purchases and sales) are found more rarely, and the survey of transfer
prices used leads to no common scheme. Rook (1971) and Emmanuel (1977, 57), for
example, study access to an external market and come to the conclusion that the
department supplying the product tends to have greater transaction freedom than
the purchasing department, i.e. the intermediate product can more often be sold
on the external market than purchased. Finnie (1978) and Lambert (1979) also
study subaspects of the transaction freedom without a clear result.
Vancil
(1978), Borkowski (1990) and Tang (1993) study interactions between the
transfer price system and organisational properties such as size,
diversification strategy and level of centralisation. Wu/Sharp (1979) identify
general rules depending on the digitally viewed availability of the market
price, and Lambert (1979) claims a significantly negative relationship between
the conflict level in the corporate departments and the use of the transfer
price system.
Overall,
it is clear that none of these empirical studies focuses on individual internal
trading transactions and that none concentrates on the effects of the transfer
price system. There is also no systematic analysis of the transaction basis in
terms of all four design parameters, delivery compulsion and opportunity for
external sale and purchase.
Conclusion
Our approach to
studying a record of individual internal trade transactions using a
standardised questionnaire produced knowledge concerning the effectiveness, use
and therefore also the design of transfer price systems that goes beyond
existing empirical research. This paper shows on the basis of a study of
individual production processes in 73 German companies that market pricebased
transfer price systems produce a fundamentally stronger perception of the
efficiency and motivation effect than those that are not market price-based.
However, their use is connected to conditions regarding the existence of a
substitute with a transparent, observable market price and a similar strategic
importance of the corporate departments. The transaction basis and transaction
freedom tend to be designed to be consistent with each other. The results of
the comparative study on the motivation and efficiency effect therefore provide
overall support for the demand for transfer price systems to be designed using
market prices in terms of their transaction basis and transaction freedom
whilst observing the necessary requirements for their appropriate use.
The
use of coordination mechanisms that are similar to markets within the company
can include the use of an external market for the intermediate product with the
corresponding issue of orders to external parties and open-result negotiations
on the internal purchase and sale. It has become clear that companies at times
want to exclude this aspect in practice. The results of the study speak clearly
for critically reviewing an excessively restrictive, non-market price-based
approach, especially when it affects the transaction freedom. This applies both
if the restrictions are explicitly in place in the form of fixed organisational
rules and if these rules have been created over time, which is frequently the
case.
On
the Necessity of Using Average Cost
as
a Base for Transfer Price
European
Financial and Accounting Journal, 2008, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 79-94
Background
Due
to the increasing role of multibusiness enterprises (hereinafter “MBE”) and
their impact on national welfare, on effectiveness of economic policies and on
quality of our lives, we should have interest to clearly and well understand
how to deal with transfer pricing issues.
Theory and practice are quite contrary about what shall be optimal transfer
price equal to. Our concern will concentrate on the optimal transfer price from
the point of view of a MBE, which experiences different income tax rates in
countries, where its affiliates have their seats. Former microeconomic
literature on transfer prices concludes that optimal transfer price should be
equal to marginal cost of production of the supplying business entity
(company). This opinion is known since the beginning of the 20th century thanks
to (Schmalenbach,1909) and in Anglo-Saxon literature then (Hirshleifer, 1956).
Of course,there are limiting conditions, which are explicitly stated to be held
while setting the transfer price that way. On the other hand the conclusion
reached in the above mentioned articles could be used in reality only under
conditions unable to be met in reality. Other topic of interest is optimal
level of transfer price in multinational enterprise with different tax levels
in different countries. Either elder or new literature on transfer pricing is
mostly based on considering the best transfer price on the level of marginal
cost.
We
could mention many other authors, who argue for market prices or negotiated
prices, but their argumentation is based on a solution of some specific problem
(information asymmetry, solution of investment allocation distortion, agency
cost, etc.). The evident collision of the marginal cost transfer pricing theory
can be shown in case of (OECD, 2001). The methods of transfer pricing supported
in OECD countries are:
1. arms-length
method
2. cost plus
method
3. comparable
resale price method
4. formula
apportionment method
5. profit split
method
Which in all
cases directly or indirectly use a premise that the fair transfer price is on
the level of price achieved at the market transaction, which are marginal cost
only in the extraordinary cases (perfectly competitivemarket of the
intermediate product). If there is no market for intermediate product, the
cost-plus method is used, which does not use marginal cost but the average cost
of intermediate product. These can be also the optimal solution, which does not
require some necessary conditions used or implied by papers deriving the
optimality of marginal cost transfer pricing.
However, already
Ronen and McKinney (1970) pointed at this problem and showed, that optimal
transfer price can be equal to average cost of intermediate product, but this
paper is rarely cited and even more rarely are its conclusions used, we rather
find marginal cost pricing. Otherwise the contemporary literature aims rather
on the information asymmetry, integration of manager’s and tax objectives or
setting of the optimal transfer price with respect to the particular problems
of financial management.
Purpose
to determine whether the optimal transfer price must be equal to the
marginal cost of supplying companies and designated by the centralized
(headquarters MBE) or whether it should be determined through negotiations or
even set at the market rate (long sleeve) price.
Analysis
Tools
The analysis tool used is the Marginal Cost Transfer
Pricing Rule, the average transfer Cost Pricing Rule.
Object
of Research
object in this paper is the transfer price
Discussion
Let us suppose that the market for intermediate
product is perfectly competitive. Under this condition the only solution for
price of intermediate product is marginal cost of production of intermediate
product, just because of the nature of the market. In the long run all
companies sell their production at the lowest possible price – at the minimum
of average cost on perfectly competitive market. This average cost is also
marginal cost for that given quantity of intermediate product.
If the market for intermediate product were
imperfectly competitive, slightly different situation would occur. On the
imperfectly competitive market supplying division (company A) could chose any
price within range determined by shape and corners of demand curve (of course
with regard to its cost function). Nevertheless, marginal cost could be also
suitable as a price of intermediate product in this case. Monopoly profit, achieved
on the sales of the intermediate product to external consumers enables
supplying company not to use its monopoly power in case ofsales to B and set
price for intragroup deliveries on the level of marginal cost. Quite different
situation occurs, when market of intermediate product does not exist. In this
case there is no external power forcing company A to sell at minimum of average
cost and depending upon character of the final product there can or does not
have to be space for shifting price of intermediate product.
We have concluded in previous paragraphs that
sometimes it is possible to use marginal cost as optimal transfer price in
world without taxes (tax differentials), agency cost, etc., but according to
our opinion it is particularly due to the fact that external conditions either
enable or even force and fix transfer price on such level. We consider marginal
cost of intermediate good production not to be good measure for ex ante setting
transfer price even in world without taxes and agency cost nor for doing so ex
post. The first reason that leads us to this statement is that marginal cost
transfer pricing rule distorts resource allocation. The second one is that the
above proposed way of transfer pricing would lead to suboptimal decisions in that
sense, that it distorts the total cost curve perceived by company selling final
product. We will discus both reasons further.
Let us suppose that at the beginning there are one
or more non-MBEs. We could assume that profit and cost functions of all firms
on the market are the same because of the nature of the perfectly competitive
market. Its/their profit functions would be whereas profit function of MBE as
an economic entity would be (if we derived transfer price the above shown way)
which after some rearrangements could be written in the same way as. In
revenues are divided according to the factor (labour, capital) cost and those
are fully covered by revenues in the single company including both production
of A and B, thus under condition of perfect competition on the market of the
final product and on the input factor markets economic profit equals zero.
If the transfer price were set on level of marginal
cost of supplying division in the case of MBE, revenues could be divided
differently from factor cost. This situation would lead either to shifts and
change of shape of production and cost functions or, in case that managers
realized that inefficiency to backward shifts in profit, compensating wrong
transfer price. Let us assume perfectly competitive market of final product in
the absence of market for intermediate product.
All companies operate at the lowest possible average
cost on the perfectly competitive market, so that if managers of MBE did not
realize the inefficiency, changes in the cost functions would lead to complete
loss of competitiveness in long run because of inability to acquire either
enough capital or enough labour or to produce at competitive price. If we
assumed that managers of MBE arrange backward shifting of profit, we would get
to the same state as in equation, except for the problem that shifting of
profit could have non-zero cost (thus again in long run MBE would probably lose
ability to compete its rivals). Actually we do not impose the assumption that
the backward shifting of profit would have non-zero cost, but we just cannot
exclude that possibility. Under absence of market for intermediate product and
perfectly competitive market of final product we can say that transfer price at
a level of marginal cost is unstable and would earlier or later lead to cease
of MBE, if we did not impose additional assumptions causing the MBE’s design to
have some advantages compared to the single-entity company.
If a market for intermediate good existed, but was
not perfectly competitive, the situation would be a bit more complicated,
because the optimal level of a transfer price depends among other factors upon
characteristics of market of the final product. Transfer price could fall
within range of prices, which could also include marginal cost of intermediate
good A production, without loss of competitiveness. Would each of those prices
be also at level ensuring efficient allocation of resources? We think it would
not. Though there is no general solution for this market situation. Even though
in this case the best solution for the MBE is that one, which equates marginal
cost of production of intermediate good and net marginal revenue of company B,
we can see that the best solution is not transfer price at level of marginal
cost of intermediate product.
Conclusion
Both older and recent literature on transfer pricing
are not unified about the opinion whether the optimal transfer price should be
equal to marginal cost of supplying company and set by centralized decision (of
a MBE headquarters) or whether it should be set by negotiation or even set on
the level of market (arms-length) price. Those, who argue for setting transfer
price by negotiation or at the market price levels, base their arguments on
market imperfections like information asymmetry, motivation of managers, et
cetera. Most of the others replicate Schmalenbach’s (1909) derivation of the
marginal cost transfer-pricing rule in spite of evident contradiction to
economic reality (e.g. Lutter et al., 1987). We have proved that the optimal transfer
price should be equal to average cost of the supplying division plus part (or
the whole) of economic profit of the MBE, independent on the market conditions
at the market of either intermediate or final product. Such a transfer pricing
rule can be set either by a holding company, which rules the supplier and buyer
of intermediate product, or can be forced by external conditions (in the market
for intermediate product). Our solution is suitable in system, where MBE’s
headquarters sets the transfer-pricing formula and either let the divisions to
negotiate about optimal quantity or set it by centralized decision. Though our
solution was not entirely new, because Ronen and McKinney (1970) came to
similar conclusions, lot of recent papers using marginal cost pricing scheme
and the state of contemporary economic textbooks call for paper that would
explain under generally acceptable assumptions the disadvantages of marginal
cost pricing solution. We also offer a design of full costing mechanism
(variable costing) that uses advantages of marginal costing and also advantages
of full costing by charging separately variable cost (by level of production)
and fixed cost (as cost fixed for a given time period).
Several private interviews with CFOs of MBEs have
confirmed practical use the above transfer pricing design, but unfortunately
the interviewees required absolute confidentiality, so no conclusion could have
been drawn on it. At least we should mention the transfer pricing rules by OECD
(2001), which are widely applied by tax authorities and use methods, which
assume that the transfer price is based on actual average cost of intermediate
product.
To avoid overpricing of intermediate product
(overspending of supplying division), it would be suitable to use pre-determined
(planned) full cost of intermediate product (cp. Miller and Buckman, 1987).
Thus this paper allows us to find theoretical concept that would fit and could
be extended for examination of transfer pricing policies for taxation (e.g.
transfer pricing methods used in OECD, 2001) as well as for managerial
purposes.
Although these findings were not solely new, their
synthesis as well as generalization of average cost transfer pricing rule were
needed as many recent papers still used marginal cost pricing rule without
reflecting its unrealistic assumptions. Our results are applicable on MBEs in
general, thus also on multinational enterprises as subgroup of MBEs. This paper
has been intended as introduction for wider research into optimal taxation with
respect to transfer pricing. Therefore the main application of the findings
derived in this paper is to support analysis of transfer pricing rules and tax
rules design, with respect to international transfer pricing. However further
use might be much wider as our conclusions probably would influence design of
models of optimal transfer price in presence of taxation, information
asymmetry, etc. (which in many cases draw on the marginal cost transfer pricing
rule).
Kajian Pengukuran Kinerja
Dan
Penetapan Harga Transfer
(Bambang Pamungkas dan Iriyadi,
Jurnal Ilmiah Ranggagading
Volume 8 No. 2, Oktober 2008 :
86-94)
Latar Belakang
Pengertian harga
transfer adalah harga jual khusus yang dipakai dalam pertukaran divisi untuk
mencatat pendapatan divisi penjualan (selling division) dan biaya divisi
pembelian (buying division). Harga transfer mengukur nilai produk (yakni barang
atau jasa) yang diserahkan oleh pusat laba kepada pusat pertanggungjawaban
lainnya dalam perusahaan. Harga transfer ditetapkan untuk produk-produk antara.
Produk-produk antara (intermediate product) adalah barang-barang dan jasa-jasa
yang dipasok oleh divisi penjualan kepada divisi pembelian.
Masalahpenentuan harga
transfer dijumpai dalam perusahaan yang organisasinya disusun menurut pusat-pusat
laba dan antar pusat laba yang dibentuk tersebut terjadi transfer barang dan
jasa. Latar belakang timbulnya harga transfer mempunyai peran ganda, di satu
sisi harga transfer mempertegas diversifikasi yang dilakukan oleh manajemen
puncak. Harga transfer menetapkan dengan tegas hak masing-masing manajer divisi
untuk mendapatkan laba. Dalam penentuan harga transfer, masing-masing divisi
yang terlihat merundingkan berbagai unsur yang membentuk harga transfer, karena
setiap unsur yang membentuk harga transfer akan berdampak terhadap laba yang
dipakai sebagai pengukur kinerja mereka. Di sisi lain, harga transfer berperan
sebagai salah satu alat untuk menciptakan mekanisme integrasi. Dalam penentuan
sumber pengadaan barang misalnya, manajemen puncak dapat menempuh kebijakan
jika menguntungkan perusahaan secara keseluruhan, manajer divisi diwajibkan
untuk memilih sumber pengadaan dari divisi lain dalam perusahaan, tidak dari
pemasok luar. Dengan kebijakan ini, manajer divisi dipaksa untuk merundingkan
harga transfer yang adil bagi semua divisi yang terlibat. Sehingga dua atau
lebih divisi yang terpisah perlu melakukan hubungan dalam mencapai tujuan
perusahaan bersama, harga transfer mendekatkan dua atau lebih divisi yang semua
melakukan bisnis secara independen.
Dengan ditetapkannya
harga transfer ini diharapkan dapat memicu manajemen masing-masing divisi untuk
mencapai sasaran laba divisinya dengan cara yang menunjang keberhasilan
perusahaan secara keseluruhan tanpa menghilangkan sifat otonomi divisi tersebut
pada keseluruhan laba perusahaan dari kontribusi tersebut dapat tercermin
prestasi yang diperoleh suatu divisi, sehingga terjadi suatu penyimpangan yang
dilakukan suatu divisi mengakibatkan terjadinya kerugian pada divisi tersebut.
Penetapan harga
transfer yang optimal adalah penting mengingat besarnya harga transfer
merupakan pendapatan bagi pusat laba penjual dan sebaliknya merupakan biaya
bagi pusat laba pembeli. Kesalahan dalam menetapkan harga transfer akan
mengakibatkan kesalahan pengukuran kinerja yang berakhir pada kesalahan
pengambilan keputusan. PT. X adalah perusahaan yang bergerak dalam bidang
industry karoseri (pembuatan badan kendaraan) baik untuk jenis kendaraan niaga
maupun kendaraan non niaga. Perusahaan ini terdiri dari 4 divisi, di antaranya:
1. Bagian Komponen dan Perakitan, 2. Bagian Dempul, 3. Bagian Interior, 4.
Bagian Finishing.
Perusahaan di dalam
memproduksi barang berdasarkan pada pesanan dimana perusahaan tersebut telah
memiliki beberapa pelanggan tetap. Proses produksi pada PT. X secara umum
merupakan proses pengolahan bahan baku menjadi barang setengah jadi menjadi
barang jadi yang siap untuk dikirim ke pelanggan dan untuk dipasarkan.
Penelitian ini dilakukan sebagai satu kasus untuk mengetahui harga transfer
antar divisi pada sebuah perusahaan karoseri.
Tujuan
Tujuan dalam jurnal penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui metode harga
transfer yang digunakan dan membandingkan dengan penggunaan metode harga
transfer lainnya.
Alat Analisis
Alat analisis yang digunakan jurnal penelitian ini adalah metode harga
transfer berdasarkan biaya dan metode harga transfer berdasarkan harga pasar.
Objek Penelitian
Objek dalam jurnal penelitian ini adalah PT. X merupakan perusahaan
yang bergerak dalam bidang industry karoseri (pembuatan badan kendaraan) baik
untuk jenis kendaraan niaga maupun kendaraan non niaga.
Pembahasan
Berdasarkan data dalam jurnal penelitian ini, bahwa perusahaan dalam
menetapkan harga transfer dengan menggunakan metode biaya penuh maka posisi
laba terbesar ada di bagian finishing dan laba terkecil di bagian komponen dan
perakitan, sedangkan dengan menggunakan metode harga pasar laba terbesar ada di
bagian komponen dan perakitan dan laba terkecil ada di bagian dempul.
Kesimpulan
Dari hasil jurnal penelitian ini, dalam pengukuran kinerja PT. X
mempunyai beberapa manajer yang membawahi masing-masing bagian, dimana manajer
tersebut mempunyai wewenang dan tanggungjawab di dalam melakukan aktivitas dan
menjalankannya. Pengukuran kinerja ini adalah kegiatan yang rutin dalam menilai
kinerja-kinerja yang lain.
Apabila penetapan harga transfer dengan menggunakan metode biaya, maka
harga perakitan body mobil yang ditransfer dari bagian komponen dan perakitan,
bagian dempul dan bagian interior mengalami peningkatan per unit. Laba bagian
komponen dan perakitan, bagian dempul, bagian interior dan bagian finishing
mengalami peningkatan.
Apabila perusahaan dalam menetapkan harga transfer dengan menggunakan
metode biaya penuh laba terbesarnya ada pada bagian finishing, sedangkan dengan
menggunakan metode harga pasar laba terbesar ada pada bagian komponen dan
perakitan.
ASPEK
PERPAJAKAN DALAM PRAKTIK
TRANSFER
PRICING
(Fadjar
Harimurti, Jurnal Ekonomi dan Kewirausahaan
Vol. 7, No. 1, April 2007 : 53-61)
Latar Belakang
Interdependensi
antar negara yang diikuti dengan semakin pesatnya hubungan perdagangan dan
ekonomi khususnya di bidang permodalan telah menimbulkan suatu perkembangan
tatanan baru dalam perekonomian dunia, yaitu munculnya unifikasi ekonomi global
dengan kecenderungan ke arah regionalisasi maupun globalisasi. Globalisasi
ekonomi telah membawa dampak semakin meningkatnya transaksi internasional atau cross
border transaction. Arus barang, orang, jasa, dan permodalan (investasi)
antarnegara telah menjadi berlipat ganda. Saat ini pergerakan modal dan dana
dari satu negara ke negara lain menjadi lebih besar dari sebelumnya. Lahirnya General
Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) dan World Trade Organisation (WTO)
telah mengurangi kendala-kendala dalam pergerakan barang, jasa dan modal antar
negara. Perusahaan-perusahaan tidak lagi membatasi operasinya hanya di negara
sendiri, akan tetapi merambah ke manca negara dan menjadi perusahaan
multinasional dan transnasional. Mereka beroperasi melalui anak usaha dan
cabang cabangnya di hampir semua negara berkembang dan pasar-pasar yang sedang
tumbuh.
Dalam
lingkungan perusahaan multinasional, terjadi berbagai transaksi antar anggota
yang meliputi penjualan barang dan jasa, lisensi hak dan harta tak berwujud
lainnya, penyediaan pinjaman dan sebagainya. Penentuan harga atas berbagai
transaksi antar anggota korporasi tersebut dikenal dengan sebutan transfer
pricing (harga transfer). Praktik transfer pricing ini dulunya
hanya dilakukan oleh perusahaan semata-mata hanya untuk menilai kinerja antar
anggota atau divisi perusahaan, tetapi seiring dengan perkembangan zaman
praktik transfer pricing sering juga dipakai untuk manajemen pajak yaitu
sebuah usaha untuk meminimalkan jumlah
pajak yang harus dibayar.
Tujuan
Penelitian
Untuk
mentransmisikan data keuangan di antara departemen-departemen atau divisi-diisi
perusahaan pada waktu mereka saling menggunakan barang dan jasa satu sama lain,
untuk mengevaluasi kinerja divisi dan memotivasi manajer divisi penjual dan
divisi pembeli menuju keputusan-keputusan yang serasi dengan tujuan perusahaan
secara keseluruhan.
Alat Analisis
Alat analisis yang digunakan dalam jurnal penelitian ini adalah :
1.
Harga
Transfer Dasar Biaya (Cost-Based Transfer Pricing)
2.
Harga
Transfer atas Dasar Harga Pasar (Market Basis Transfer Pricing)
3.
Harga
Transfer Negosiasi (Negotiated Transfer Prices)
Objek Penelitian
Objek dalam
penelitian jurnal tersebut adalah transfer pricing (harga transfer)
pada perusahaan multinasional dan menurut hukum positif perpajakan Indonesia.
Pembahasan
Pada Perusahaan Multinasional
Transfer
pricing yang dilakukan oleh perusahaan multinasional ini
berdasarkan jangkauan geografis operasi perusahaannya tergolong ke dalam transfer
pricing transnasional. Transfer pricing transnasional berkenaan
dengan transaksi antardivisi dalam satu entitas hukum atau antarentitas legal
dalam satu entitas ekonomi yang meliputi berbagai wilayah. sedangkan transfer
pricing domestik berhubungan dengan penghitungan harga transfer barang atau
jasa antar badan dalam satu grup korporasi besar atau antar divisi dalam
satu korporasi dalam satu wilayah (Gunadi, 1999) Memperhatikan deskripsi
diatas, kiranya jelas bahwa transfer pricing adalah hal yang lazim
digunakan dalam manajemen suatu perusahaan, terutama perusahaan yang memiliki
sejumlah pusat pertanggungjawaban yang berbeda, sebagaimana dikatakan oleh
Shapiro dalam Gunadi (1994:42) bahwa dari aspek manajemen keuangan, transfer
pricing dapat merupakan instrumen perencanaan dan pengendalian mekanisme
arus sumber daya entitas ekonomi bagi perusahaan secara keseluruhan. Untuk
keperluan perencanaan dan pengendalian manajerial, suatu entitas legal atau
entitas ekonomi (beberapa entitas legal yang berada dalam kepemilikan atau
penguasaan yang sama) dapat dipecah menjadi beberapa pusat responsibilitas (responsibility
center).
Suatu survey yang dilakukan oleh
Ernst & Young LLp, (1999) menemukan
bahwa masalah transfer
pricing merupakan masalah utama dalam bidang perpajakan selama kurun waktu
dua tahun terakhir yang terjadi pada perusahaanperusahaan multinasional di
seluruh dunia. Oleh karena itu banyak kantor akuntan publik melakukan audit
compliance, untuk melakukan pemeriksaan atas masalah transfer pricing ini
yang memang berpengaruh terhadap jumlah pajak yang harus dibayarkan. Persentase
dilakukannya audit compliance pada perusahaan perusahaan multinasional
yang tersebar di berbagai negara besar di dunia. Biasanya cegah tangkal yang
dilakukan oleh negara-negara dengan adanya transfer pricing adalah
membuat suatu kewenangan, dimana pemerintah diberikan wewenang untuk menentukan
kembali dengan cara me-realokasikan kembali jumlah laba dan biaya-biaya yang
timbul di perusahaan multinasional yang notabene punya beberapa divisi,
sehingga laba dan biaya-biaya yang timbul sebagai hasil transaksi antar divisi
tersebut yang ditengarai sebagai suatu praktik transfer pricing yang
bisa meminimalkan pajak terutang dapat di cegah. U.S.- Based multinationals
are subject to Internal Revenue Code Section 482 on the pricing of intercompany
transactions. This section gives the IRS the authority to reaalocate
income and deductions among divisions if it believes that such
reallocation will reduce potentiak tax evasion (Hansen and Mowen, 1996:
543).
Lebih
lanjut ditegaskan bahwa dalam IRS, apabila terjadi transaksi antar divisi dalam
perusahaan multinasional atau terjadi transaksi dalam perusahaan yang mempunyai
hubungan istimewa, maka harga yang berlaku adalah harga yang timbul apabila
transaksi tersebut dilakukan dengan pihak-pihak di luar perusahaan atau dengan
kata lain, transaksi dilakukan dengan pihak-pihak yang tidak punya hubungan
istimewa. Meskipun dari sisi korporasi multinasional transfer pricing merupakan
alat untuk memobilisasi laba usaha untuk tujuan usahanya, otoritas fiskal
(apparat perpajakan) selalu menginginkan transaksi yang terjadi antardivisi atau
antarperusahaan dalam satu grup tetap mengacu pada harga pasar wajar dan
bersifat arm’s length.
Negara
berkembang, termasuk Indonesia, menyadari bahwa korporasi multinasional dengan
berbagai kelebihannya mempergunakan rekayasa transfer pricing untuk
mengalihkan potensi pajak Indonesia ke negara lain dengan berbagai dalih,
alasan dan justifikasi atas rekayasa tersebut. Oleh karenanya, otoritas fiskal
secara subyektif memandang tujuan dilakukannya transfer pricing adalah
untuk menghindari pajak, terutama terkait dengan isu mengenai kelayakan
alokasi penghasilan, keuntungan dan biaya di antara jurisdiksi pajak
yang berbeda-beda dimana korporasi multinasional tersebut beroperasi.
Menurut menurut hukum positif perpajakan
Indonesia
Undang-undang
perpajakan Indonesia selama sepuluh tahun keberadaannya, belum pernah
mencantumkan secara eksplisit istilah transfer pricing maupun
penanganannya Perhatian lebih terhadap masalah transfer pricing ini,
membuat pemerintah memasukkan klausul masalah penting ini dalam Paket Perubahan
Undang-Undang Pajak Tahun 2000. Pasal 18 ayat (3a) UU PPh menyebutkan bahwa: “DJP
(Dirjen Pajak) berwenang melakukan perjanjian dengan wajib pajak dan bekerja
sama dengan pihak otoritas pajak negara lain untuk menentukan harga transaksi
antar pihak-pihak yang mempunyai hubungan istimewa, yang berlaku selama suatu
periode tertentu dan mengawasi pelaksanaannya serta melakukan renegosiasi setelah
periode tertentu tersebut berakhir”.Memori penjelasan pasal tersebut
menyatakan bahwa: “kesepakatan harga transfer (Advance Pricing
Agreement/APA) adalah kesepakatan antara wajib pajak dengan DJP mengenai
harga jual wajar produk yang dihasilkannya kepada pihak-pihak yang mempunyai
hubungan istimewa (related parties) dengannya. Tujuan diadakannya APA
adalah untuk mengurangi terjadinya praktik penyalahgunaan transfer pricing oleh
perusahaan multi nasional. Persetujuan antara wajib pajak dengan DJP tersebut
dapat mencakup beberapa hal antara lain harga jual produk yang dihasilkan,
jumlah royalty, dan lain-lain, tergantung pada kesepakatan. Keuntungan dari APA
selain memberikan kepastian hukum dan kemudahan penghitungan pajak, fiskus
tidak perlu melakukan koreksi atas harga jual dan keuntungan produk yang dijual
wajib pajak kepada perusahaan dalam grup yang sama. APA dapat bersifat
unilateral, yaitu merupakan kesepakatan antara DJP dengan wajib pajak atau
bilateral, yaitu kesepakatan antara DJP dengan otoritas perpajakan Negara lain
yang menyangkut wajib pajak yang berada di wilayah yurisdiksinya”. Berdasarkan
hal tersebut, pengaturan lebih jauh mengenai bagaimana wajib pajak mencapai
kesepakatan harga transfer dengan DJP melalui APA menjadi hal yang penting mempertimbangkan
resiko koreksi fiskal yang dapat dilakukan oleh pihak otoritas pajak berkenaan
dengan indikasi ketidakwajaran harga yang diberlakukan kepada pihak-pihak yang
mempunyai hubungan istimewa.
Kesimpulan
Transfer
pricing didefinisikan
sebagai suatu harga jual khusus yang dipakai dalam pertukaran antardivisional
untuk mencatat pendapatan divisi penjual (selling division) dan
biaya divisi pembeli (buying division). Transfer pricing sering
juga disebut dengan intracompany pricing, intercorporate pricing, interdivisional
atau internal pricing yang merupakan harga yang diperhitungkan untuk
keperluan pengendalian manajemen atas transfer barang dan jasa antar anggota
(grup perusahaan). Tujuan transfer pricing adalah untuk mentransmisikan
data keuangan di antara departemen-departemen atau divisi-divisi perusahaan
pada waktu mereka saling menggunakan barang dan jasa satu sama lain. Praktik transfer
pricing sering digunakan oleh banyak perusahaan sebagai alat untuk meminimalkan
jumlah pajak yang harus dibayar. Adanya hubungan istimewa merupakan kunci dari
dilakukannya praktik transfer pricing dalam bidang perpajakan. Hubungan
istimewa dalam perpajakan ditandai dengan adanya hubungan antara dua atau lebih
Wajib Pajak yang berada di bawah pemilikan atau penguasaan yang sama baik secara
langsung maupun tidak langsung, adanya hubungan antara Wajib Pajak yang
mempunyai penyertaan 25% atau lebih pada pihak yang lain. Hubungan istimewa
juga ditandai dengan adanya hubungan keluarga baik sedarah dan semenda dalam
garis keturunan lurus dan/atau ke samping satu derajat. Kekurang-wajaran dari
harga transfer (non arm's length price) yang ditimbulkan dengan
adanya praktik transfer pricing dapat terjadi atas: harga penjualan;
harga pembelian; alokasi biaya administrasi dan umum (overhead cost);
pembebanan bunga atas pemberian pinjaman oleh pemegang saham (shareholder
loan); pembayaran komisi, lisensi, franchise, sewa, royalti, imbalan
atas jasa manajemen, imbalan atas jasa teknik dan imbalan atas jasa lain;
pembelian harta perusahaan oleh pemegang saham (pemilik) atau pihak yang
mempunyai hubungan istimewa yang lebih rendah dari harga pasar, penjualan
kepada pihak luar negeri melalui pihak ketiga yang kurang/tidak mempunyai
substansi usaha.
Beberapa
hambatan penerapan APA di Indonesia, seperti: (i) kurangnya sumber daya manusia
yang memiliki keahlian khusus di bidang transfer pricing; (ii) sistem
pendataan dan dokumentasi yang masih belum memadai dan terorganisir baik; serta
(iii) moralitas otoritas fiskal dan wajib pajak yang masih perlu terus menerus diperbaiki,
kiranya tidak dipakai untuk dijadikan alasan agar tidak meneruskan pembenahan
prosedur teknis pengajuan APA yang telah dijadikan salah satu alternatif
pencegahan praktik transfer pricing pada korporasi multinasional dalam
UU Pajak kita.
Sumber
:
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/files/research/papers/tp_52.pdf
http://businessperspectives.org/journals_free/ppm/2007/PPM_EN_2007_02_Wolff.pdf
http://www.vse.cz/polek/download.php?jnl=efaj&pdf=85.pdf
jurnal.stiekesatuan.ac.id/index.php/jir/article/download/44/52
http://download.portalgaruda.org/article.php?article=115084&val=5259
